Abstract. Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first UnConditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCS-RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags. Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.
Introduction
As of today, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is referred to as the next technological revolution after the Internet. A typical RFID system involves a reader, a number of tags, which may range from the battery-powered, to the low-cost ones with even no internal power, and a database. RFID systems enable the identification of objects in various environments. They can potentially be applied almost everywhere from electronic passports [20, 21] , contactless credit cards [19] , to supply chain management [22, 23, 24] . Keeping RFID systems secure is imperative, because they are vulnerable to a number of malicious attacks. For low-cost RFID systems, security problems become much more challenging, as many traditional security mechanisms are inefficient or even impossible due to resource constraints. Some existing solutions utilize traditional cryptographic primitives such as hash or encryption functions, which are often too expensive to be implemented on low-cost RFID tags. Another method of securing RFID systems has been the lightweight approach. These solutions base themselves on mostly lightweight operations (e.g. bitwise or simple arithmetic operations) instead of more expensive cryptographic primitives. The HB-family(HB + ,HB ++ , HB*,etc.) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 6, 8] and the MAPfamily(LMAP,EMAP,M2AP,etc) [9, 10, 11] authentication protocols, are some examples of this kind. However, proposed lightweight protocols so far have been targeted to various successful attacks and therefore, the search for a concrete lightweight solution for authentication in low-cost RFID tags still continues. Recently, Alomair et al. embarked on the notion of UnConditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for RFID systems (UCS-RFID) [17] . UCS-RFID's security relies mainly on the freshness of five secret keys rather than the hardness of solving mathematical problems. Freshness in the keys is guaranteed with a key updating phase at every protocol run by means of a fresh random number (nonce). This nonce is generated at the reader side due to low-cost tags constraints, and delivered to the tag secretly. This allows the tags to benefit from the functionalities of random numbers without the hardware to generate them. Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a three-phase probabilistic passive attack against the UCS-RFID protocol to recover all the secret keys in the protocol. Our attack is mainly based on a weakness observed in the protocol(section 3). To put in a nutshell, the weakness implies that the more outputs we have from consecutive runs of the protocol, the more knowledge we will obtain on the nonces in these protocol runs. In other words, having more number of protocol run outputs observed, we are able to determine some of the nonces (victim nonces) with higher probability. It should be noted that this weakness has also been tackled by the authors in [17] . Nevertheless we will show that the security margin they expected from the protocol has been overestimated. Finding the victim nonce in the protocol paves the way toward adopting an attacking scenario to achieve all of the five secret keys in the system. Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the UCS-RFID protocol. In section 3 the weakness of the protocol is investigated thoroughly. Section 4 and 5 describes our attacking scenario to recover the keys, and trace the tag in the protocol. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
Description of the UCS-RFID Protocol
The UCS-RFID authentication protocol consists of two phases: the mutual authentication phase and the key updating phase. The former phase mutually authenticates an RFID reader and a tag. In the latter phase both the reader and the tag update their dynamic secret keys for next protocol runs. In this protocol, first the security parameter, N , is specified and a 2N -bit prime integer, p, is chosen. Then, each tag T is loaded with an N -bit long identifier, A (0) , and five secret keys, k
u chosen independently and uniformly from Z 2 N , Z p , Z p \{0}, Z 2 N and Z p \{0} respectively. Notation -N : security parameter.
x : observable outputs of x th protocol run -n = n l ||n r : random number in Z 2 N -n l , n r : left and right half-nonces 2.1 Mutual Authentication Phase Figure 1 shows one instance run of the mutual authentication phase in the UCS-RFID protocol. The reader starts the interrogation with a "Hello" message which Specifications -Public parameters: p, N . -Secret parameters(shared between R and T ): Fig. 1 . i th run of the mutual authentication phase in the UCS-RFID protocol is responded by tag's dynamic identifier A (i) . The reader then looks up in the database for a set of five keys(k a , k b , k c , k d , k u ) which corresponds to A (i) . If this search is successful, it means that the tag is authentic. Having the tag authenticated, the reader generates a 2N -bit random nonce n (i) uniformly drawn from Z * p , calculates messages B (i) , C (i) by (2),(3) and sends them to the tag.
The tag first checks the integrity of the received messages by (4):
This check implies the authenticity of the reader as well. Then, the tag extracts the nonce n (i) by (5.)
To conclude the mutual authentication phase, the tag transmits
Key Updating Phase
After a successful mutual authentication, both the reader and the tag update their keys and dynamic identifier (A (i) ) for the next protocol run.
It should be noted that the dynamic values have been proved to preserve their properties of independency and uniformity after updating [17] .
Observation
In this section, we shed more light on a weakness in the UCS-RFID protocol which becomes the origin of our proposed attack presented in the subsequent section. By xoring (7) and (10), we have:
Equation (13) shows that the difference between k a and k d remains the same for two consecutive runs of the protocol. This statement can also be generalized for every r arbitrary run of the protocol the as following:
By using (14) , for outputs A and D in m consecutive runs of the protocol, we have:
. . .
It is apparent that we have a set of 2m equations with 2m + 2 variables. These variables can be divided into two groups: 1. 2m half-nonces:
So, if we fix the value of variables L and k
a , we end up with 2m equations and 2m half-nonce variables. This implies that the 2m half-nonces can not be chosen independently and fulfil the above equations simultaneously. In other words, if we observe the outputs of m consecutive runs of the protocol, it is only necessary to search over all possible sequences of k (i) a and L, which is 2 2N , and then it will be possible to find all 2m half-nonces uniquely. As we will see, this weakness is the result of introduction of a tighter bound for the half-nonces while we keep observing more runs of the protocol. By the randomness nature of the generated half-nonces, the total number of possible sequences for them (2 2N ) is uniformly distributed over them. This implies that each of the 2m half-nonces is expected to have a bound of 2m √ 2 2N possible values (comparing to its previous bound which was N ). Therefore, for m consecutive protocol runs, the total number of possible values distributed over the 2m half-nonces is 2m
. Now, if we exclude the value which half-nonces has taken already(2m 2m √ 2 2N − 2m), we can calculate the probability that at least one half-nonce does not receive another possible value (remains constant). To do so, we utilize the well-known problem in probability theory(i.e. Given r balls thrown uniformly at random at b bins, the probability that at least one bin remains empty which is calculated by (21)) [18] : 
Now, it only requires to substitute b = 2m and r = 2m. (21) and then we will have (22) . The result is plotted in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows the probability of inferring at least one half-nonce in terms of the number of consecutive runs of the protocol required to be observed to do so. For example, if we observe 35 runs of the protocol runs with N =256, we will be able to determine at least one of the 70 transmitted half-nonces with the probability of more than 0.99. We will use the term "victim half-nonce" for inferred half-nonce and notation m h instead of m for the number of consecutive runs of the protocol required to infer one half-nonce hereafter. 
Our Attack Scenario
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic approach to find the number of consecutive runs of the protocol to infer one half-nonce. But in our attack, we need to have a complete nonce(left and right corresponding half-nonces) to recover all secret keys. To achieve this goal, we propose an attacking scenario which consists of the three following phases:
1. Finding the total number of necessary consecutive runs of the protocol to find a complete victim nonce (m t ). 2. Finding the victim nonce. 3. Recovering the secret keys.
Phase I: Finding m t
In section 3, we proposed a probabilistic way to calculate the number of consecutive runs that must be observed by an adversary to infer a half-nonce(m h ). It is obvious that if we keep observing more runs of the protocol(i.e. more than m h ), after each extra observation, another half-nonce can be inferred. This is simply possible by eliminating the two equations which contain the first victim half-nonce and adding two newly observed equations to the set of equations (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) and then, we again have 2m h equations and 2m h + 2 variables which yield another half-nonce inference. If we intend to find a complete nonce, we must continue observing the runs of the protocol until we infer two corresponding victim half-nonces to form a complete nonce. To do so, we should first calculate the probability that the inferred half-nonce at (m e + m h ) th run matches one of the previously victim half-nonces.
As we know, after m h runs of the protocol, we accomplish to find one victim half-nonce, after m e extra runs of the protocol, we have β = 2m h + 2m e equations and β half-nonces which m e + 1 of them can be inferred. The probability that none of these m e + 1 half-nonces match is:
Pr(Having no pair after m h + m e runs) = (β − 1)
Consequently, the probability of having at least one pair after observing m e runs is simply calculated by (24) .
P e = Pr(Having at least one pair of matching half-nonces after m h + m e runs)
By using (22) and (24) the total number of protocol runs to have at least one complete victim nonce (m t = m h + m e ) can be calculated by (25) and is plotted in Figure 3 .
P t = Pr(Having at least one complete nonce after m t runs)
Remark The authors of [17] have also calculated m t by using some other protocol outputs (B and C). The results show that the security margin of the protocol in terms of the number of consecutive runs that must be observed to infer one nonce is less than what the designers of the protocol expected. In other words, we need less number of protocol runs to infer at least one nonce. For example a passive adversary is able to infer a complete nonce with high probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of the protocol for the key size of 128 and 256 bits respectively. These numbers were expected to be 110 and 200 respectively.
Phase II: Finding the constant nonce
Having m h consecutive runs of the protocol observed, we have one constant half-nonce or one half-nonce with only one possible value. In order to find this half-nonce, we adopt the following algorithm.
1. Determine a level of confidence(probability) for the final results.
Our Result Expected Fig. 3 . Comparison of expected security margin of the UCS-RFID protocol and our results in terms of the number of consecutive protocol runs an adversary must observe in order to infer at least one nonce.
2. Find the m h , m t related to the determined probability from Figures 1,2 respectively. 3. Calculate m e = m t − m h 4. Choose two random numbers from Z 2 N and assign them to L,k (i) a respectively.
Find 2m nonces (n
6. Repeat 4 and 5 as many times as we observe that only one half-nonce keeps its value for all of the repetitions. 7. Save the constant(victim) half-nonce. 8. Observe another run of the protocol.
-
r ). 9. Replace the equations corresponding to the found victim half-nonce with two newly observed equations in the equation set (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) .
10. Repeat 4,5,6,7,8 for m e times. 11. Match two corresponding victim half-nonces(e.g. n
r ).
Phase III: Key Recovery
In the previous two phases of our attack, we accomplished to find a complete victim nonce n (j) ,with a certain probability, by observing m t consecutive runs of the protocol. Now, we present how an adversary is able to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To find k
c and k
To recover k
u , we need to find the nonce in the next run (n (j+1) ), thus we should calculate the updated keys for the (j + 1) th run using (7) and (10).
Then we have:
Using (30) and (33), we can write:
Finally, by using (27),(32) and,(34) we can find k
The procedure above provides us with our objective to recover all of the secret keys with a certain probability(P t ). This probability can be increased by paying the price of having more protocol run outputs available. Furthermore, as it can be seen from the (32) and (34), next nonce is also achievable. This implies that the secret keys of the next run can also be calculated by using (26-35) for the next run. This is an ongoing procedure which yields the keys of any arbitrary run of the protocol(r) which r > j. Being able to generate the future secret keys, an adversary is capable of either impersonating both the reader and the tag or tracing the tag.
On the Traceability of the UCS-RFID
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic key recovery attack against the UCS-RFID protocol. We mentioned that according to Figure 3 , we need to have about 90 runs of the protocol to be almost sure that our found keys are correct. But with less number of protocol run outputs, we still can apply an attack against the traceability of the protocol. In this section, we formally investigate the untraceability of the UCS-RFID based on the formal description in [12] .
Adversarial Model
According to [12] , the means that are accessible to an attacker are the following:
We denote a tag and a reader in i th run of the protocol by T i and R i , respectively. A Passive Adversary, A P , is capable of eavesdropping all communications between a tag and a reader and accesses only to the Execute(T i , R i ): .
Attacking Untraceability
The result of application of an oracle for a passive attack O P ⊆ {Execute(.)} on a tag T in the run i is denoted by w i (T ). Thus, a set of I protocol run outputs, Ω I (T ), is: Ω I (T ) = {w i (T )|i ∈ I} ; I ⊆ N ;(N denotes the total set of protocol runs). The formal description of attacking scenario against untraceability of a protocol is as following: 
A P decides which of T 1 or T 2 is T , then outputs her guess T´.
For a security parameter,k, if Adv U N T A P (k) = 2P r(T´= T ) − 1 > then we can say that the protocol is traceable. For UCS-RFID case, as Figure 3 implies, an adversary A P needs only to access to about 40 and 65 consecutive runs of the protocol to be able to determine n (j) with a probability of more than 0.5 (e.g. 0.6) for k =128 and 256 respectively and then according to section 4.3, she will be able to recover the keys of subsequent runs. After, key recovery, the adversary can easily distinguish a target tag with any other challenge tag given by the challenger. So we have: 
Conclusions
The design of suitable lightweight security protocols for low-cost RFID tags is still a big challenge due to their severe constraints. Despite of interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete solution. Recently, Alomair et al have proposed the first authentication protocol based on the notion of unconditional security. Regardless of some inefficiencies in UCS-RFID authentication protocol, such as: large key sizes, using modular multiplication ,etc ,which makes this protocol an unsuitable nominate for low-cost RFID tag deployment, we presented a passive attack which showed that even the security margin which was expected to be yielded by UCS-RFID has also been overestimated. In our attack, we showed that a passive adversary is able to achieve the all secret keys of the system with a high probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of the protocol for the key size of 128 and 256 bits respectively. Tracing the tag in the protocol is also feasible even by less number of runs of the protocol (e.g. 40, 65). Our results suggest a major rethink in the design of the authentication protocols for RFID systems based on unconditional security notion. Drastic changes are necessary to fulfil both technological constraints and security concerns in RFID systems.
